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Were we to take the depictions and reliefs of Ramesses
II, Seti I,
there successors and their
predecessors at face value, it might lead us to sometimes believe that their
contact with neighbors was always on the field of battle. Many of these reliefs
on the exterior of temple walls portray war as both thrilling and glamorous,
having also religious undertones. On these walls we are, repeatedly, almost
like the high budget advertisements of our modern society, treated to scenes of
the king vanquishing the enemy and thus fulfilling his duty to defeat the forces
of chaos and preserve ma'at. Again and again, we see the brave pharaoh driving
his chariot behind fiery steeds as he fearlessly leads his nervous troops into
the fray. He stands single handedly sometimes in his two man chariot alone,
firing arrows as he charges ahead, or at other times, beats his cringing enemies
to death with a club.
The message is clear. Pharaoh triumphant sacrifices his
enemies to the greater glory of Egypt and her gods. The Defeated
enemy invariably adopts an attitude of total submission, for
he knows that it would be futile to struggle against his fate.
These enemies very often included the Nubians to the south of
Egypt, the Libyans to Egypt's west and the Asiatics to the
east. They appear again and again to suffer at the hands of
pharaohs, as depicted on temple walls, even when they were not
a threat.
No one was better at this propaganda than Ramesses the Great, who always won
his wars and always forced his enemies to grovel at his feet. For example, even
though many scholars believe he lost ground with the Battle of
Kadesh, he nevertheless had no fewer than ten inscriptions,
a
longer "poem" and a shorter "bulletin"
carved on the walls of five temples, along with accompanying
reliefs. These, of course, all depicted Ramesses II victorious,
but few of these
accounts conform to our modern standards of historic reporting. In fact, some
battles depicted by later pharaohs, were actually
campaigns of earlier kings whom the current pharaoh wished to emulate, while
others depicted kings such as Amenhotep III and his son,
Akhenaten smiting enemies when in fact they probably never
personally participated in military actions at all.
An examination of Ramesses II's campaigns, as depicted on the walls of his
various temples, seems to show that his military leadership was not overly impressive, if stripped of their
hyperbole. If the Battle of Kadesh, his most documented campaign, is any
indication, he was almost certainly an unimaginative strategist who was better
as a front line warrior than as a military leader. We must give him credit for
his personal involvement in a number of campaigns, as well as
his good intentions, and he did expand Egypt's territory, even
in southern Syria. Because of the peace treaty with the Hittites, he was also able to use these possessions to
increase the wealth of Egypt.
Just as the Egyptian temple walls were a fortress against the chaos of the
secular world protecting the peace, or ma'at within, so too were Egypt's
borders. The Two Lands (Egypt) might also be viewed in a certain way as a temple to
the Egyptian gods, for pharaoh ruled the world. He had an religious duty to
protect its borders from the corrupt and vile foreigners. So from a fairly early
age, Ramesses, as the future pharaoh, was trained in the art of warfare. We know
that he probably accompanied his father, Seti I on some of his
campaigns, and as he grew older, was placed in charge of
various military actions.
In fact, when Egypt's ships and northernmost towns suddenly
found themselves under serious threat by pirates (Sherden), it
was Ramesses II, while still co-regent in one of his earliest
actions as a commander, who was placed in charge of their
elimination. Posting soldiers and
ships at strategic points
along the coast, Ramesses II waited patiently until the
Sherden appeared. He surprised and captured them, inducting
many of their survivors into the Egyptian army. While the
Battle of Kadesh often dominates the scholarly view of
Ramesses II's military prowess, he nevertheless did enjoy more
than a few outright victories over the enemies of Egypt.
Ramesses II must be applauded for his protection of Egypt
proper's borders. After all, this was one of pharaoh's prime
directives. Not long after he neutralized the threat posed by
Sherden pirates, he established a defensive line along Egypt's
northwestern frontier. Archaeologists have identified at least
three of these forts to the west of the modern city of Alexandria, and another two in the western Delta at Tell
Abqa'in and Kom el-Hisn. These were probably only a part
of an extensive chain of forts protecting Egypt's northwestern
regions.
While not a new innovation, these forts which were often
built near water holes in order to deny access to Libyans
infiltrating the prosperous Delta, probably became very useful
when, during the reigns of several of his successors (Merenptah
and Ramesses
III), Libyans attempted a larger scale invasion
into the region.
Yet, Ramesses II's military aspirations were to the east,
and for good reason. Since Nubia was virtually a province of
Egypt during his reign, and there was little to be gained to
Egypt's west, imperial gains could really only be realized in
southern Syria. During the Old and
Middle Kingdoms there were
occasional campaigns against specific fortified Canaanite
towns, but Egypt's real involvement with the region was in
trade. In fact, so important was this trade to the
Canaanites, that after the collapse of Egypt's Old Kingdom, the
Canaanite economy failed as well. However, it was not until
the New
Kingdom, following Ahmose's expulsion of the
Hyksos,
that Egypt's military attention became focused on southern
Syria. By the time of Tuthmosis
III, Egypt would see its
greatest expansion into southern Syria. However, Egypt never
seems to have been very committed to this expansion, or
perhaps more correctly, their strategy for holding the region
was faulty. There was
never a sizable, permanent Egyptian military presence
committed to the region. Instead, Egypt depended on the
loyalty of local chiefs to oversee their interests, which soon
became an undependable means of controlling the region. Egypt
would be repeatedly required to mount military campaigns into
southern Syria in order to hold, or as often as not, prevent
the total collapse of these holdings.
This weakness in Egypt's strategic goals were never clearer than
in the reign of Ramesses II's father, Seti
I. He seems to have
had considerable military success in the region, probably for
a brief time, increasing Egypt's expansion almost to the
extent of his early 18th Dynasty predecessors. This may have
included most of southern Syria, as far north as Kadesh. Yet,
by the time of his death, much of that territory was lost, and
there is no doubt that Ramesses II sought to return it to
Egyptian hands.
As early as the forth year of Ramesses II's rule, the
important kingdom of Amurru was returned to Egyptian hands,
but this also signaled a great battle to come, for it would
ultimately result in the Battle of
Kadesh, an action that
Ramesses II claimed as a victory, but which most Egyptologists
see, at best, as a draw between the Hittites and Egypt. It
resulted in a peace treaty that, while excluding the city
state of Kadesh which Ramesses II had sought to control,
nevertheless allowed a measure of peace and prosperity throughout the remainder of
Ramesses II's reign.
Major Sections on Ramesses II
See also:
References:
| Title |
Author |
Date |
Publisher |
Reference
Number |
| Armies of the Pharaohs |
Healy, Mark |
1992 |
Osprey Publishing |
ISBN 1 85532 939 5 |
| Dictionary of Ancient Egypt,
The |
Shaw, Ian; Nicholson, Paul |
1995 |
Harry N. Abrams, Inc.,
Publishers |
ISBN 0-8109-3225-3 |
| Egyptian Warfare and Weapons |
Shaw, Ian |
1991 |
Shire Publications LTD |
ISBN 0 7478 0142 8 |
| History of Ancient Egypt, A |
Grimal, Nicolas |
1988 |
Blackwell |
None Stated |
| Oxford
History of Ancient Egypt, The |
Shaw, Ian |
2000 |
Oxford University Press |
ISBN 0-19-815034-2 |
|
Ramesses: Egypt's Greatest Pharaoh |
Tyldesley, Joyce |
2000 |
Penguin Books |
ISBN Not Listed |
|
Ramesses II: Greatest of the Pharaohs |
Menu, Bernadette |
1999 |
Harry N. Abrams, Inc. |
ISBN 0-8109-2870-1 (pbk.) |
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